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Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents
and Montana's New Rule 4B
By THOMAS E. TOWE*
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of modern methods of transportation and communica-
tion and the consequent shrinkage of the relative size of our nation it is
not surprising that the old concept of limiting the exercise of personal juris-
diction to persons found within the boundaries of the forum state has been
discarded. Personal jurisdiction has been forced to adapt to the greatly
expanded flow of persons and commerce across state lines.
It is the purpose of this article to explore the inroads that have been
made on the traditional concept of jurisdiction and to discuss the present
constitutional limitations controlling the new and expanded concept of per-
sonal jurisdiction. Analization of these constitutional limitations indicates
that three elements are necessary to meet the requirements of due process.
The text of this article will correlate the new Rules of Civil Procedure, re-
cently adopted in Montana, with this new concept of personal jurisdiction.
I. EXPANSION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
NON-RESIDENTS
A. TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION.
The traditional common law concept of jurisdiction was the exercise
of physical power over the persons or properties involved in the litigation.'
Under the doctrine established by Pennoyer v. Neff2 it was thought that
because a state could not extend the force and effect of its law beyond its
boundaries, it likewise could not extend the force and effect of its service
of process beyond its boundaries.' A judgment obtained without proper
service of process on the defendant is rendered without jurisdiction and is
an arbitrary interference with the defendant's liberty and property.' There-
fore, except in cases where the defendant had property within the state,'
*LL.B. 1962, Montana State University; Member of the Montana Bar.
"'The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power." McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S.
90, 91 (1917); Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East. 192, 103 Eng. Rep. 546 (Ct. of King's
Bench, 1808); Schisby v. Westenholz, L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 (Ct. of Queen's Bench 1870).
295 U.S. 714 (1878).
3"The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of
one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by
jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation
outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal
established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either
persons or property to its decisions." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
'See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) ; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940);
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
'Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151 (1884) (dictum) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)
(dictum). Jurisdiction over a non-resident who has property in the state was
limited to in rem actions directly involving that property or quasi in rem actions
involving the attachment of that property to pay a personal obligation. Freeman
v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886) ; Educational Studios v. Consolidated Film Indus.
112 N.J. Eq. 352, 164 Atl. 24 (1933); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102
(1934) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 32 (1942) ; 1 BEAL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 441,
§ 102.1 (1935) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 172-175 (3d Ed. 1949).
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where the defendant was personally served within the jurisdiction of the
court,' or where the defendant had consented to the jurisdiction of the
court," a judgment against a non-resident defendant was unconstitutional
and void."
B. JURISDICTION OVER A DOMICnLLRY
The first suggestion that physical power over the defendant may not
be necessary to sustain jurisdiction came from the Supreme Court of the
United States in McDonald v. Mabee! The Court held, in that case, that
service by publication would not bind a domiciliary of the state who has
left the state intending not to return where another form of substituted
service is available which is more likely to give him notice in fact. How-
ever, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated: "No doubt there
may be some extension of the means of acquiring jurisdiction beyond serv-
ice or appearance.'"" The suggestion in the Mabee case was directly con-
firmed in Milliken v. Meyer' which held that personal service upon a
domiciliary while he is temporarily outside the state will subject him to the
court's jurisdiction.
C. JURISDICTION OVER NoN-RESIDENT MOTORISTS
Even before the Mabee case, the foundation was being laid for an even
greater inroad on the traditional concept of jurisdiction. The advent of
the automobile caused states to search for methods of guaranteeing a forum
within the state for a redress of injuries caused by a foreign defendant
temporarily motoring within the state. New Jersey passed a law prohibit-
ing the use of its highways by a non-resident until such non-resident ap-
pointed the secretary of state as his process agent for any actions arising
out of such use. This statute was upheld in Kane v. New Jersey;'2 the
Supreme Court said that such a requirement did not deny equal privileges
and immunities to non-residents. Massachusetts then passed a law making
6Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913) ; Fitzsimmons v. Johnson, 90
Tenn. 416, 17 S.W. 100 (1891). A non-resident defendant may be brought under
the jurisdiction of a court by service on him personally while temporarily within
the jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT, JUGDMENT § 15 (1942) ; Peabody v. Hamilton, 106
Mass. 217 (1870) ; Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116 (1872).
7RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 81 (1934) ; York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890)
(appearance) ; Egley v. Bennett & Co., 196 Ind. 50, 145 N.E. 830 (1924) (Confession
of Judgment); Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931) (by con-
tract).8Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) ; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906);
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) ; Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
Such a judgment was open to collateral attack and was not entitled to full faith
and credit. See Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 457 (1875) ; Old Wayne
Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907).
Judgments purporting to bind non-resident defendants were said to be uncon-
stitutional on several grounds. The most obvious ground for attacking such a
judgment was on the basis of a violation of due process and equal protection under
the 14th amendment. See text accompanying note 4 supra,. Also, such a judg-
ment was attacked as violating the privileges and immunities clause and the in-
terstate commerce clause of the constitution. Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident
Motorists, 39 HARV. L. REv. 563, 565 (1926).
9243 U.S. 90 (1917).
10Id. at 91. The court continues: "To dispense with personal service the substitute
that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required if
subsantial justice is to be done."
11311 U.S. 457 (1940).
242 U.S. 160 (1916).
[Vol. 24,
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JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENTS
the operation of a motor vehicle on the roads of Massachusetts the equivalent
of an appointment of the secretary of state as a process agent. This law
was upheld in Hess v. Pawloski. Pointing out the dangerous character
of motor vehicles, the Supreme Court said it was within the public interest
to regulate residents and non-residents alike in the promotion of care on
the part of all who use the highways.' The court maintained that there
was no discrimination because a resident was already subject to suit within
the forum. In both the Hess case and Wuchter v. Pizzutti' the Supreme
Court held that if the law makes a reasonable provision for probable com-
munication of notice to the defendant and the defendant has a reasonable
opportunity to appear and defend there is no violation of due process.
Although the court in the Hess case spoke in terms of implied consent to
the appointment of the secretary of state, it is well established now that
jurisdiction over a non-resident motorist does not rest on consent. All of
the fifty states and the District of Columbia have non-resident motor ve-
hicle statutes today."
D. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Another inroad on the Pennoyer v. Neff doctrine was developed through
an attempt to subject foreign corporations to the personal jurisdiction of
the courts. Originally it was thought a corporation, as a fictitious person
could not be present outside the state of its incorporation.' Under the
Pennoyer v. Neff doctrine courts had to obtain de facto power over the de-
fendant's person to obtain personal jurisdiction, and, therefore, jurisdic-
tion could not be obtained over foreign corporations."
As corporate business increased, two theories were devised to obtain
jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The first was based on consent.
It was said that a corporation, being a creature of state law, could be pro-
' 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
1 Id. at 356. Accord, Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., Inc., 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
"The potentialities of damage by a motorist, in a population as mobile as ours,
are such that those whom he injures must have opportunities of redress against
him provided only that he is afforded an opportunity to defend himself." Olberding
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., Inc., supra at 341.
'4276 U.S. 13 (1928).
'OEven before the decision of the Hess case, Scott, writing for the Harvard Law
Review urged that the basis of the non-resident motorist statutes should not rest
on any fiction involving consent. Scott, Juri8diction over Nonresident Motorists,
39 HARV. L. REv. 563 (1926).
In 01berding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., Inc., 346 U.S. 338 (1953), the Supreme Court
held that consent to federal venue could not be implied from the driving of an
automobile in the district. At page 341 the court said: "But to conclude from this
holding that the motorist, who never consented to anything and whose consent is
altogether Immaterial, has actually agreed to be sued and has thus waived his
federal venue rights is surely to move in the world of Alice in Wonderland." Al-
though this case deals with federal venue rather than state jurisdiction, it seems
clear that the Supreme Court gives no credulence to the fiction of implied consent.
It seems that Scott would limit the extention of jurisdiction to the extent that
a State is able to prevent a nonresident from committing specified acts. Scott, Jur-
isdiction over Nonresident Motorists, 39 HARV. L. REv. 5M3, 581 (1926).
'All the statutes except those of Hawaii and Alaska are cited in footnote 1 of Non-
resident Motorist Statutes-Their Current Scope, 44 IOWA L. REv. 384.
'4Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) ; Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
'See GOODRicH, ColFucT OF LAWS § 76 (3rd Ed. 1949).
1962]
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hibited entirely from doing business in another state.' Admission to do
business, therefore, might be conditioned upon the appointment by the
corporation of a resident agent to receive service of process' or upon con-
sent to an appointment by the state of such an agent.' It soon developed
that doing business in the state could be made the equivalent of an ap-
pointment of a process agent on the theory that by doing such business,
the corporation had given implied consent to the appointment of the
agent."
The second theory devised to obtain jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions was based on presence. A corporation which was doing continuous
and systematic business within the state was said to be present within the
state." Once a corporation was found to be present within a state it could
be bound by service of process just as any other individual found within
the state."
Gradually the courts began to realize that both theories are really based
on a fiction." Judge Learned Hand and Professor Scott advocated drop-
ping the fictions of consent and presence. Instead, they would base the
court's jurisdiction on regulations to which it is reasonable and just to
subject a corporation as though it had consented." The Supreme Court
finally repudiated these fictions in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.'
The rejection of these two theories brought forth another problem;
namely, how much contact with a state must the defendant have in order
"Bank of Augurta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) ; Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856). After these cases were decided it developed
that a corporation engaged in interstate commerce could not be entirely prohibited
from doing business within a state other than the state-of its incorporation. Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183-84 (1868) (dictum) ; Pensacola Tel. Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. (VI Otto) 1 (1877). However, this point seems to
have been overlooked in the subsequent cases discussing consent as a basis forjurisdiction.
'St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882).
"Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856) ; Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U.S. 147, 158 (1903).
"American Ry. Exp. Co. v. Royster Guano Co., 273 U.S. 274, 280 (1927) ; Washing-
ton e.r rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361 (1933).
A state may provide for service upon a state officer if a corporation appoints an
agent and then withdraws him. Washington ez rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker,
Inc. v. Superior Court, supra.
"Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917> (dictum) ; Hutch-
inson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2nd Cir. 1930).
'St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
"If a corporation fails to or refuses to file the necessary statutory consent, it is
clearly a fiction to say that it has, by implication, given its consent to be sued.
See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). Similarly, it is
a fiction to say a corporation is present wherever its agents have committed acts.
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2nd Cir. 1930). Furthermore,
once a corporation withdraws its agents from a state, it cannot still be said to be
actually present under any concept of the word "present"; however, it would still
be subject to suit. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U.S. 147 (1903).
See generally, GoonamCn, CONFLICT OF LAWS 210-13 (3rd Ed. 1949).
"Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915);
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2nd Cir. 1930); Scott, Jurisdiction
over Nonregidents Doing Busine88 Within a State, 32 HARv. L. REV. 871 (1919)
Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists, 39 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1926).
"326 U.S. 310 (1945). "For the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to
symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts
will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process." Id. at 316.
[Vol. 24,
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JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENTS
to make the service upon him consistent with the constitutional limits of
due process.' The landmark case on this question is International Shoe
Co. v. Washington" in which the State of Washington was allowed to re-
cover unpaid contributions to the state's unemployment compensation fund
from a Delaware corporation. According to the Supreme Court in that
case, due process requires only that the defendant have certain minimum
contacts with the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,' "' The
test is a qualitative one and not quantitative; it depends upon reasonable-
ness in view of the nature and kind of local activities engaged in by the
defendant. As applied to the facts in the International Shoe Co. case, it
was held that a shoe manufacturer who has salesmen continuously operat-
ing within a state meets the test even though there was no office established
and no contracts were completed within the state.
The test was given further clarification under Travelers Health Ass'n
v. Virginia ex rel. State Corporation Commission' where it was held that
a non-resident corporation doing a mail order insurance business within
the state may be sued there. In that case, the defendant had claim investi-
gators operating within the state and its policyholders were made members
of the Association and were encouraged to recommend other prospects.
Finally, the limits of due process were extended to a lone transaction
of a single item of business within the state. In McGee v. International
Lift Insurance Co.' the defendant took over from the insurer an insurance
policy on the life of the insured, a resident of California; the only contact
the defendant ever had with the state of California was the mailing of re-
insurance certificates to the insured in California and receiving from him
the annual premiums. The Supreme Court held that California had a
manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents
when the insurers refuse to pay claims; therefore, since the defendant had
actual notice there was no violation of due process.
E. JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT INDIVIDUALS
Another significant inroad on the traditional concept of jurisdiction
was the extension of jurisdiction over non-resident individuals doing busi-
ness within the state. Unlike corporations not engaged in interstate com-
merce, a non-resident individual cannot be excluded from a state alto-
gether without violating the privileges and immunities clause of the federal
Constitution.' Therefore, it had been held that doing business within a
9A single or occasional act was not enough. Rosenberg Bros. & Co., Inc. v. Curtis
Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923). Continuous activity of some type within a state
was not enough. Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907) ;
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). See Simon v. Southern Ry.,
236 U.S. 115 (1915) ; People's Tobacco Co., Ltd. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S.
79 (1918). Continuous activity within a state was enough. Tauza v. Susquehanna
Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917). For the position of the Montana
Supreme Court see State ex rel. American Laundry Mach. Co. v. District Court,
98 Mont. 278, 41 P.2d 26 (1934).
81326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'Id. at 316.
'0339 U.S. 643 (1950).
3'355 U.S. 220 (1957).
"Flexner x. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
1962]
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state, no matter how continuous or systematic, was not sufficient grounds
for exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident individual.'
This theory, however, has been repudiated. In Doherty & Co. v. Good-
ant -n a non-resident individual engaged in the corporate securities business
established a branch office in Iowa. A statute permitting service of process
on the district manager, in spite of a clear absence of authority to receive
it, was upheld. The court said there was no abridgment of equal privileges
or immunities because a state has a clear right to regulate the selling of cor-
porate securities by residents and non-residents alike.
In the Doherty case, as in Hess v. Pawloski," the Supreme Court em-
phasized the fact that an interest subject to the special regulatory power
of the state was involved.' Thus, it could be argued that jurisdiction over
non-resident individuals is limited to those situations in which a state has
a "high social interest," such as the operation of motor vehicles,' the
selling of securities,"' and the conducting of dangerous operations within
the state.' This question has not been firmly decided by the Supreme Court
cf the United States. However, from the language and the reasoning of the
International Shoe case, it seems that the Supreme Court intended the
"minimum contacts rule" to apply to individuals as well as to corpora-
tions." Furthermore, the distinction between individuals and corporations
on the theory that the privileges and immunities clause applies to the
former and not the latter seems to have been drained of its vitality by the
International Shoe case; there the defendant was engaged in interstate
commerce and could no more be prohibited from conducting busine ss with-
in the state than could an individual. Mr. Justice Trayner of the California
Supreme Court has made the following statement:'
The rationale of the International Shoe case is not limited
to foreign corporations, and both its language and the cases sustain-
ing jurisdiction over non-resident motorists make clear that the
'Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919). The court said that since a state did not
have the power to exclude a non-resident individual, the implied consent theory
failed. This reasoning would be valid even under the ideas of Professor Scott and
L. Hand, i.e., jurisdiction should be based on regulations to which it is reasonable
and just to subject the defendant as though he had consented.
"294 U.S. 623 (1935).
3274 U.S. 352 (1927).
'Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 628 (1935) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352, 356 (1927).
"See text accompanying note 14, supra.
'Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
"Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1944). See Developments in Juri8diction
over Nonre8idevt Individuals Doing Local Business, 3 DUKE B.J. 78 (1952).
'The court in the International Shoe case constantly talks in terms of a person and
not a fictituous business entity. For example at page 316 the court states: "His-
torically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personarn is grounded on
their de facto power over the defendant's person .... due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in parsonam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it .. " The reasoning of the court is as equally applicable to individuals as to
corporations. A corporation does not have an exclusive right to "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice." "Of course Mr. Justice Stone in Inter-
national Shoe was speaking about jurisdiction over corporations, but there is no
reason why this approach is not equally applicable to jurisdiction over individuals."
Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 647 (4th Cir. 1961).
"'Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 822, 345 P.2d 921, 924 (1959).
[ Vol. 24,
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minimum contacts test for jurisdiction applies to individuals as
well as foreign corporations.
Non-resident individuals have been considered subject to local jurisdic-
tion on the same basis as corporations by the American Law Institute," by
lower federal courts," and by various state courts." The same principle
applies to partnerships and unincorporated associations."
F. JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENTS FOR ACTIONS UNRELATED TO
THEIR CONTACT WITH THE STATE
The final significant inroad on the traditional concept of jurisdiction
based on physical power was the development of jurisdiction over non-
residents doing business in the state for actions unrelated to that business.
As early as 1917 it was thought that a corporation could be so completely
present within a state that it should be subject to an cause of action brought
in the courts of that state.
Thus, in Tauza v. Susquehana Coal Co.' a Pennsylvania corporation
which maintained a sales manager, eight salesmen, a suite of offices, eleven
desks, and many stenographers in New York was subject to a suit in New
York on a cause of action unrelated to the business it conducted there."
This view was adopted by the Supreme Court in Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co.' In that case a Philippine corporation was carry-
ing on continuous and systematic business with the state of Ohio on a
temporary basis while it was excluded from the Philippines by Japanese
occupation. The Court held it was subject to a suit for recovery of past
dividends in a state court in Ohio. The Court stated at page 446: "We find
no requirement of federal due process that either prohibits Ohio from
opening its courts to the cause of action here presented or compels Ohio
to do so."
It has been suggested that the rule enunciated in Perkins v. Benquet
Consolidated Mining Co. should be limited to situations in which the
courts of the corporation's domicile are not available to the plaintiff." In
fact, at least one court has stated that the Perkins case should be limited
"RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 22, 23 (1942) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 77-86 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
"Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1961). See Insull
v. New York World-Tel. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1959) ; Wagenberg
v. Charleston Wood Products, 122 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.S. Car. 1954).
"Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959) ; 'State ex rel. Weber
v. Register, G7 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1953).
"See, McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union, 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S.W.2d 1 (1952);
Schluter v. Trentonion Publishing Co., 4 N.J. Super. 294, 67 A.2d 189 (Super. Ct.
1949) ; Lewis Mgf. Co. v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 245, 295 P.2d 145 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1956) ; Note, Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 909, 936-37 (1960).
"8220 N.Y. 259; 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
"Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the court, said: "The essential thing is that the
corporation shall have come into the state: When once it is here, it may be served;
and the validity of service is independent of the origin of the cause of action."
Id. at 918.
-342 U.S. 437 (1952).
5 Note, Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909,
932 (1960).
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to its own peculiar fact situation." The Perkiins case, however, has been
followed many times in both federal and state courts without such a
limitation.'
A major problem arises in determining how much business the de-
fendant must do within the state to make it constitutionally subject to any
cause of action. Most courts indicate that the business must be continuous
and systematic, which implies having an office, some employees and a
considerable amount of business activitity within the state.' The third
tentative draft of the Restatement of Conflicts states the following test:
"doing business is doing a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby
realizing pecuniary benefit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing
a single act for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a series
of such acts."'
It has been held that the mere solicitation of orders by authorized
agents within the state" is not sufficient nor is the docking of a ship at a
port within the state once or twice a year" sufficient business to make the
foreign corporation present within the state for all purposes. However,
the leasing of a commercial airplane and its crew to an associate company
has been held to constitute sufficient business to subject the lessor to all
suits, where the associate operated within the state and sold "through
tickets" within the state.'M
Apparently there are no cases applying the above rule to individuals.
Although the rule is particularly adapted to corporations who often have
their principal place of business in a state other than the state of in-
52L. . Reeder Contractors v. iIiggins Indus. Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959). In
this case the defendant had not qualified to do business in the state and had no
employees or office in the state; the only contact it had with California was the
shipment of .$1000 of merchandise into the state annually to independent contrac-
tors. aind exhibitions at certain fairs.
T Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Davis v. Asano
Bussan Co., 212 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Lau v. Chicago & No. W. Ry., 14 Wis.
2d 329, Ill N.W.241 158 (1961) ;Iumas v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 253 N.C. 501,
117 S.E.2d 420 (1960) ; Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 222, 347
P.2d 1, 3 (1959) (dictum); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent.
Draft No. 3) §§ 85, 92 (1956). In addition, see the following cases in which the
rule was approved but the decisions against jurisdiction were based on state
statutes: Arkansas-Louisiana Feed & Fertilizer Co. v. Marco Chem. Co., 292 F.2d
197 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir.
1959) ; McAvoy v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 185 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Ark. 1960) ;
Silas v. Paroh S.S. Co., 175 F. Supp. 35 (E.I). Va. 1958) ; Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing
Co., 405 Pa. 123, 173 A.2d 123 (1961).
'The court in the Perkins case gave the following indication of the amount of busi-
ness necessary: "On the other hand, if the same corporation carries on, in that
state, other continuous and systematic corporate activities as it did here--consist-
ing of directors' meetings, business correspondence, banking, stock transfers, pay-
ment of salaries, purchasing of machinery, etc.-those activities are enough to make
it fair and reasonable to subject that corporation to proceedings in personam in
that state, .... " 342 U.S. at 445.
6
5REsTATEMENT (SIcOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 3) § 85, comment b
(1956). It should be mentioned that in all of the illustrations given by the Re-
statement involving a suit upon a cause of action not arising out of the business
done in the state, the defendant's only place of business is outside his resident or
domicil state.
66McAvoy v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 185 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Ark. 1960).
'Silas v. Paroh S.S. Co., 175 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Va. 1958).
"'Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955). See generally
Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1 (1959) (Opinion
by Mr. Justice Traynor).
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corporation, it would seem the same principles should apply to unincorpor-
ated associations, partnerships, and individuals who conduct continuous
and systematic business within the state.' The third draft of the Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws (Second) has taken this position.'
The subjection of a non-resident engaged in interstate commerce to a
suit not related to any business done within the state may violate the inter-
state commerce clause' because of the increased burden in having to defend
a suit in an inconvenient forum. There are three cases which tend to sub-
stantiate this conclusion,' but all three have been strictly limited to their
particular facts, i.e., to a railroad company which is merely soliciting
traffic within the state without any other business there.' In light of the
more recent developments in the general area of jurisdiction over non-
residents it is doubtful that the exercise of jurisdiction on those particular
facts would constitute an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce."
G. A NEW CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION AND HANSON V. DENCKLA
It is apparent that the United States Supreme Court, in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington," established a new concept of jurisdiction over
non-residents. The concept of jurisdiction based on physical power over
the litigants was rejected and replaced by a concept of jurisdiction based
upon the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the forum
state. According to the International Shoe decision, the exercise of juris-
diction will be constitutional only if the defendant has "certain minimum
contacts" with the forum state.' The quality and not the quanity of the
contacts is decisive," and the contacts must be such that the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
The Interational Shoe case clearly left the precise nature of the con-
tacts required under the due process clause indefinite; the constitutionality
"See text accompanying notes 44, 45, 46, and 47 supra.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT or LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 3) § 85 (1956).
There was a major change in this section from earlier drafts by the deletion of the
requirement that the cause of action must arise out of the business done in the
state.
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 3) § 92, comment e
(1956).
'Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923) ; Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. V.
Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924) ; Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492 (1929).
"See International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 202 U.S. 511 (1934) ; Balti-
more & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941) ; Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,
315 U.S. 698 (1942).
"In fact, the test for what constitutes an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce may be the same as the test for due process. See McAvoy v. Texas E. Trans-
mission Corp., 185 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Ark. 1960).
5326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'Id. at 316.
'Id. at 319. The quantity of the contacts with the forum state, however, may be
important in determining the substantiality of the defendant's activity within the
state. For example, the repetition of many inconsequential acts may demonstrate
a single contact of a substantial nature. Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on
Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 522, 582.
"International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In the Interna-
tional Shoe case the court looks to "an 'estimate of inconveniences' which would
result to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of
business . . ." and to the extent it "enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws
of that state." Id. at 317 and 319.
1962]
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of the exercise of jurisdiction in each case was to depend primarily upon
an individual analysis of its own facts.' As a new body of law was de-
veloped, both by the legislatures and by the courts, it became apparent
that fewer and fewer contacts were required to sustain jurisdiction." In
fact, this trend appeared destined to abolish all significance in state boun-
daries.'
However, just six months after the decision in McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co.,"2 the Supreme Court refused to permit an extension of juris-
diction to the facts presented in Hanson v. Denckla.h The Court said, at
page 251: " [I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts." In
this case the settlor of a trust originally resided in Delaware where the
trust was executed, but eight years before her death she moved to Florida.
In Florida she corresponded with the trustee, a Delaware corporation, by
mail, receiving trust income and carrying on several bits of trust ad-
ministration."" While in Florida the settlor executed two powers of ap-
pointment, the validity of which gave rise to the action before the court.
Many of the interested parties were residents of Florida. However, the
Delaware trustee had no other contact with the state of Florida.
In denying that the Florida court could constitutionally assert juris-
diction over the Delaware trustee, Warren, C. J., speaking for a majority
of five, said the contacts of the trustee with the forum did not amount to
the transaction or solicitation of any business there. He distinguished the
facts from those in the McGee case by pointing to the manifest interest
which the state of California had in the McGee case to control insurance
contracts. Further, he noted that the trustee had done no "purposeful act"
within the state. " [T] he unilateral activity of those who claim some re-
lationship with a non-resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement
e'Note, Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 909,
929 (1960).
'OSee Note, 29 U. CINc. L. REv. 100, 102 & nf. 15 & 16 (1960) ; McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) ; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
260 (Black, J., dissenting) (1958).
In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra, a sufficient contact with the
forum state was found In the mere solicitation by mail of a single insurance con-
tract.
"It is interesting in this connection to compare the concept of jurisdiction that pre-
vails In many of the civil law countries in Europe. For example, Germany basesjurisdiction upon 1) domiciliation, 2) the performance of a contract within the
forum, 3) the commission of a tort within a forum, and 4) the ownership of prop-
erty within a forum. These rules apply to citizens and foreigners alike. Further-
more, the ownership of any kind of property, with more than a nominal value,
subjects one to jurisdiction on any pecuniary claim and the sum recoverable is not
limited to the value of the property. Note, Developments in the Law-State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 909, 914 (1960); Lorenzen, Conflict of Law8 of
Germany, 39 YALE L.J. 804 (1930). The same concept of jurisdiction prevails in
France but the number of acts included is greater. All French citizens are sub-
ject to French jurisdiction wherever they may be and any person who enters into
an obligation with a French citizen, by tort or by contract, is subject to French
jurisdiction. Note, Developments in the La--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 909, 919 (1960).
2355 U.S. 220 (1957).
" 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
"'The only business transacted by mail mentioned by the court was a change in the
compensation of the trustee and revocation of a portion of the trust. Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 n.24 (1958).
[Vol. 24,
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of contact with the forum State.'" Warren stated that an estimate of
conveniences is not controlling" but instead there must be "some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and pro-
tection of its laws.' "
Ir. THREE ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR JURISDICTION-
A TEST FOR DUE PROCESS
Many courts have attempted to apply the broad and general rules
established by the International Shoe case, the McGee case, and the Hanson
ease to particular fact situations; but relatively little, if any, consistency
or similarity in application can be detected. Perhaps the following three
elements, which are emphasized to a greater or lesser extent in nearly all
the cases, may be helpful in establishing a general guide. These three ele-
ments are proposed as a test for the constitutionality of the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over all non-residents for causes of action arising out
of their contacts with the forum state."
A. FIRST ELEMENT-SOME GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
T'he forum must have some interest that is served by the litigation of
the case within its boundaries. In other words it must have some reason
for providing a forum for the litigation. The activities of the defendant
which precipitated the suit must be of such a nature that the forum state has
an interest either in regulating them or in some way exercising a slight
degree of control over them.
If the forum state could prohibit the activities altogether, its govern-
mental interest is clearly very great or "high." If the activities cannot be
prohibited altogether but the forum state can exercise a considerable amount
of control in regulating them, its governmental interest is "manifest."
Finally, if the state's right to exercise control over the activities is slight
"Id. at 253.
761d. at 251 and 254.
"Id. at 253.
The four dissenting justices emphasized the nominal role played by the trustee.
Mr. Justice Black, writing for himself and Justices Burton and Brennan, claimed
the Delaware trustee was little more than a custodian because the settlor did most
of the administration. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing a separate dissenting opinion,
claimed that the Delaware trustee was just a stakeholder. Both dissenting opinions
emphasize the substantial convenience in holding the trial in Florida; 95% of
the assets under the trust were to go to Florida residents, the will was being
probated in Florida, and there were no beneficiaries or legatees in Delaware.
'"This test is applicable for determining the constitutionality of jurisdiction asserted
over foreign corporations, non-resident motorists, and all other non-resident in-
dividuals whose contact with the forum state is directly related to the cause of
action under litigation. However, it does not apply to the jurisdiction asserted
over a domiciliary or a non-resident individual or corporation for actions unre-
lated to their contact with the forum. The test of domiciliation can be found
elsewhere. A test for the contact a defendant must have with the forum state
for causes of action unrelated to his contact with the state can be found in RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND), CONFtICT OF LAws § 85, comment b (1956) : "doing a series
of similar acts [in the forum] for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary bene-
fit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act for such purpose
with the intention thereby of initiating a series of such acts."
1962]
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or only incidentally connected with the injury or the subject matter of
the suit, its governmental interest is "slight."
The need for a governmental interest was originally enunciated in the
non-resident motorist cases in which judges spoke of the "high govern-
mental interest" of the forum state in protecting its citizens from the
operation, by non-residents, of dangerous instrumentalities within the
state." It is well established, however, that such a high governmental in-
terest is no longer necessary.' The United States Supreme Court has used
the term "manifest interest" in upholding such activities as the sale of
securities within the state" and the sale of insurance within the state' as
a proper basis for extending jurisdiction. In fact there are no Supreme
Court cases extending jurisdiction over non-residents in which the Court
has not found such an interest.' At least two lower federal courts" and one
state court" have required a manifest interest to meet the due process test.
However, most courts which have recently ruled on this point require
much less governmental interest. For example, in Nelson v. Miller, the
Illinois court said that the fact the injury occurred in Illinois was sufficient
even though in that case the probability that such an injury would occur
was very slight. In Pavlovscak v. John L. Lewis,' the federal circuit court
said that activity which has a "substantial direct impact . . . upon the
'Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927);
Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., Inc., 346 U.S. 338 (1953).BCompania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955) ; Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) ;
Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959). Mr. Justice Tray-
nor, speaking for the California court, said: "The rational basis of the decisions
upholding the non-resident motorists statutes is broad enough to include the case
in which the non-resident defendant causes injury without the intervention of any
particular instrumentality." Owens v. Superior Court, Id. at 925. Both the Mc-
Gee case and the Travelers Health Ass'n case, infia note 82, are inconsistent with
the "dangerous instrumentality theory" since they involve insurance contracts,
which in no way can be considered dangerous instrumentalities.
'Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
"Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) ; McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
The manifest interest referred to here is the same as the "high social interest"
discussed in relation to jurisdiction over individuals in subsection E of Part I of
this article,
"The two most recent cases on personal jurisdiction decided by the Supreme Court
both discuss the governmental interest of the forum state in terms of a "manifest
Interest." In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. the Court said: "It cannot
be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of
redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims." 355 U.S. 220,
223 (1957). In Hanson v. Denckla the majority opinion distinguishes the McGee
case on the ground that there was no manifest interest in the facts of the Hanson
case. 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958).
"In denying jurisdiction over a non-resident mail order business which sent its ad-
vertising catalogues into the state, the circuit court of the 7th circuit said: "we
think the more recent case of Hanson v. Denckla, . . . demonstrates the McGee
case has been limited by the Court to the insurance field." Trippe Mfg. Co. v
Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1959). This case was followed in
Edwin Raphael Co., Inc. v. Maharam Fabrics Corp., 283 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1960).
"A Georgia court said: "While the rule [jurisdiction based on physical power] has
understandably been stretched for reasons of public policy to include motorists
statutes and insurance statutes, as in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra,
it is unthinkable that it should be expanded to cover the individual who enters
into a single transaction with no intention of doing more." Allied Finance Co. v.
Prosser, 103 Ga. App. 538, 119 S.E.2d 813, 816 (1961).
"11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957).
"274 F.2d 523 (3rd Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 24,
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community" will satisfy the due process clause.' In general, there seems
to be little difficulty in finding a sufficient governmental interest if the
trial conveniences and the conveniences of all the parties weigh heavily
in favor of the forum state.' To a certain extent, therefore, the govern-
mental interest is very similar to the second element of the due process test-
trial convenience. A distinct governmental interest has become so negligible
that many courts no longer mention it as a vital element of the jurisdiction
test.' Nevertheless, a valid and workable distinction is preserved. For ex-
ample, the state does not have a governmental interest if a resident of the
forum state is the middle man in a purchase of goods by a non-resident from
another non-resident, with a dispute arising as to the quality of the goods
which does not substantially concern the resident's participation in the
transaction.' Here there is no reason for the state to provide a forum for
the litigation and a sufficient governmental interest could not be found
no matter where the trial conveniences predominated. Even the dissenting
opinion in Hanson v. Denckla" is not necessarily inconsistent with this
concept of governmental interest.
B. SECOND ELEMENT-TRIAL CONVENIENCE
The forum state must be in a favorable position with regard to the
relative conveniences of the parties and the court. In estimating the rela-
tive conveniences, the courts frequently look to the same factors that are
considered important for applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens,"
i.e., ease of access to sources of proof, availability of the witnesses, need
to view the premises, the public interest of the court, the dispositive law
which will govern the case, and all other matters which will make the trial
of the case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Greatest weight, however,
seems to be given to the place of residence of all the parties' and to the
inconvenience to the defendant in requiring him to defend a suit in the
forum state.'
"Id. at 525. This case involved rights to a pension from a union welfare and re-
tirement fund. Mine operators in Pennsylvania paid money into the fund and
retired miners in Pennsylvania received substantial allowances from the fund, and
about 10% of all the administration of the fund was conducted in Pennsylvania.
These activities were sufficient to subject the fund to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.
'See Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954),
cert. denied., 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
"See Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir.
1961) ; Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2nd Cir. 1960) ; Gray
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961) ; W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Nuodex Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 1957).
"See L. D. Reeder Contractors of Ariz. v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th
Cir. 1959).
'357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
'Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961);
L. D. Reeder Contractors of Ariz. v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.
1959) ; Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) ;
Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
"See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
noted that that note was concerned with situations in which only a single act had
been committed. Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations Based on a
Single Act: A New Sole for International Shoe, 47 GEo. L.J. 342 (1958).
"See Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357, 368 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 257 (1958)
(dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
"Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
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Prior to Hanson v. Denckla' trial convenience was given primary im-
portance. Some of the key state court cases discussed trial convenience at
great length and appear to have based their decision on this point." How-
ever, trial convenience is clearly de-emphasized in Hanson v. Denckla.
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Warren states: "Those restrictions
[on personal jurisdiction of the state courts] are more than a guarantee
of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation."'" Again at page 254
Mr. Justice Warren states: "It [the court] does not acquire that jurisdic-
tion by being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most con-
venient location for litigation." As both dissenting opinions point out,
Florida (the forum state) was clearly the most convenient forum for all
parties when considered as a whole."w Although at least one court has
based a decision on this de-emphasis,m trial convenience is not generally
ignored as a necessary element of jurisdiction over non-residents.' While
the Hanson case indicates that jurisdiction does not necessarily abide the
most convenient forum, it is difficult to exclude trial convenience from the
minimum contacts test. Trial convenience constitutes an inherent part of
what the International Shoe case' called "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. '
C. THIRD EEMENT-A PURPOSEFUL ACT OF THE DEFENDANT
There must be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
himself of the benefits and protections afforded him by the laws of the
forum state. This element is taken directly from the language of the ma-
jority opinion in Hanson v. Denckla, which states :w
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of con-
-357 U.S. 235 (1958).
"Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 604 (1951) ; Com-
pania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955) ; Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
9'357 U.S. at 251.
'Both dissenting opinions emphasized the minor role of the Delaware trustee and
explained how the real controversy was between Florida residents. See note 78,
&Upra.
'%'robark v. Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 15S N.E.2d 73 (1959).
'See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) ; L.D. Reeder Contractors of Ariz. v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265
F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959).
-z326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"'See the discussion of this test in note 68, 8upra. In discussing the fairness re-
quirement of Mr. Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion (Hanson v. Denckla),
spoke of nothing but convenience. At 259 he stated: "I can see nothing which ap-
proaches that degree of unfairness. Florida, the home of the principal contenders
for Mrs. Donner's largess, was a reasonably convenient forum for all. Certainly
there is nothing fundamentally unfair in subjecting the corporate trustee to thejurisdiction of the Florida courts." The importance of the dissent In the Hanson
case should not be underrated in as much as it was a 54 decision and two of thejustices sitting on the case are no longer with the court (Mr. Justice Burton and
Mr. Justice Whittaker).
The strong connection between fairness and convenience was also emphasized
in L.D. Reeder Contractors of Ariz. v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.
1959). Quoting from 47 Go. L.J. 342, 351-52 (1958), the court stated at 774:
"The reasonableness of subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction under this rule
[minimum contacts necessary for fair play and substantial justice] is frequently
tested by standards analogous to those of forum non convenlens."
-357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
[Vol. 24,
16
Montana Law Review, Vol. 24 [1962], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol24/iss1/1
JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENTS
tact with the forum state. The application of that rule will vary
with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the defend-
ant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws.
There are two parts to this element. First, the defendant must estab-
lish contacts with the forum state on his own initiative. Second, he must
have enjoyed benefits from the protection afforded him by the laws of the
forum.' The terms "benefit" and "protection" are open to very broad
interpretation; this part of the third element causes little difficulty. The
privilege of conducting any activities for pleasure or for profit within the
forum State is clearly such a benefit.' Access to the courts of the forum
state to enforce any rights arising out of transactions within the state is
sufficient whether or not use is made of this privilege.' The privilege of
having its product marketed in the state under the normal protections of
the laws of the state is sufficient.'
The part of this element that gives the most difficulty is the problem
of determining what type of contact with the forum state constitutes a
purposeful act of the defendant. Clearly the transactions of any business
within the state with a profit motive will constitute such an act.' For this
purpose a single act done within the state is sufficient,' and neither the
defendant nor his agent need be present within the state. ' Also, causing
injury while within the state to perform a single contract constitutes such
an act."
'The following cases emphasize the commission of a purposeful act by the de-
fendant as a part of the minimum contacts rule: Kaye-Martin v. Brooks, 267
F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d
73 (1959) ; L.D. Reeder Contractors of Ariz. v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768
(9th Cir. 1959) ; Florence Nightingale School of Nursipg, Inc. v. Superior Court,
168 Cal. App. 2d 74, 335 P.2d 240 (1959) ; Gray v. An~rican Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
'"[T]here [must] be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (Emphasis added). See Florence Nightingale School of
Nursing, Inc., v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 2d 74, 335 P.2d 240, 246 (1959).
'ONelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d G73, 680 (1957).
O'Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 26 432, 176 N.E.2d
761, 766 (1961).
"'Florence Nightingale School of Nursing, Inc. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 2d
74, 335 P.2d 240 (1959) ; Gavenda Bros., Inc. v. Elkins Limestone Co., 116 S.E.2d
910 (W. Va. 1960) ; Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107
A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denie, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
"'Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961).
"'McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (defendant's only contact with
the forum state was by mail) ; Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77,
346 P.2d 409 (1959) (distribution through a manufacturer's representative) ; S.
Howes Co. v. W.P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 ((Okla. 1954) (defendant sold to an
independent contractor outside the state but shipped the goods directly to the
plaintiff within the state). Contra, Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426.
158 N.E.2d 73 (1959) (defendant was held not subject to jurisdiction in Illinois for
breach of contract with an independent contractor who had contracted for the ex-
clusive distribution of defendant's product in Illinois). However, it is submitted
that this case is overruled by implication by Gray v. American Radiator & Stand-
ard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
Lm Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) ; Nelson
v. Miller, 11 Ill. 26 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
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In Hanson v. Denckla the court said that the Delaware trustee who
entered into the trust agreement before the settlor moved to Florida had
done no purposeful act to invoke the protection and benefit of the Florida
law. Further, the court said there was nothing that the settlor or anyone
else could have done to bring the trustee under the jurisdiction of the
court; the purposeful act must come from the defendant."' In Kaye-Martin
v. Brooks,1' the court held that a non-resident who discussed a contract with
another non-resident while he was attending a convention in Chicago, when
the contract was not initiated, finalized nor to be performed in Illinois,
had not committed a purposeful act in the state of Illinois.'e
Solicitation
It would seem that solicitation of orders within the state should clearly
fall within the definition of a purposeful act. ' However, there has been
some difficulty on this point. Before the International Shoe case was de-
cided, a line of cases commencing with Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.'
had taken the position that "mere solicitation" was not a sufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction. This so-called "solicitation plus" doctrine, which
required something in addition to mere solicitation, was not easily rejected
and has had an effect on many of the recent cases.' Nevertheless, it has
been soundly repudiated' and is clearly inconsistent with the most recent
cases.=
Newspaper Distribution
It would seem that the distribution of newspapers within the forum
state would constitute the doing of a purposeful act. However, there is a
well established line of cases holding that non-resident newspaper com-
panies who ship their publications into the state to subscribers or to inde-
pendent contractors for sale on news stands are not subject to the state's
jurisdiction.' But a television station which broadcasted its programs
"'Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
"'267 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959).
"4"Brooks did not come to Illinois for the purpose of negotiating with Hansen or Kaye-
Martin but rather to attend a convention. Moreover no party to this action, inso-
far as the record shows, had any intention of invoking any of the benefits or protec-
tions of the laws of the State of Illinois. The fact that some of the events leading
up to execution of the final contracts in Dallas, Texas, occurred in Chicago was
wholly fortuitous." Id. at 397, 398. Cf. Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas Co., 249 F.2d
198 (7th Cir.'1957) (A Louisiana proprietor who hired an Illinois lawyer and engi-
neer to incorporate his business under the laws of Delaware was held not to be
subject to jurisdiction in Illinois).
"'Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2nd Cir. 1960). Berlemann
v. Superior Distrib. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 522, 151 N.E.2d 116 (1958).
"'205 U.S. 530 (1907).
'"See Arundel Crane Service, Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 214 Md. 387, 135 A.2d 428(1957) ; Le Vecke v. Griesedieck W. Brewery, 233 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1956) : Mac-
Innes v. Fontainbleau Hotel Corp., 257 F.2d 832 (2nd Cir. 1958); Stanga v. McCor-
mick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959).
'Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Henry R. Jahn &
Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 859, 323 P.2d 437, 440 (1958); See
Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2nd Cir. 1960) ; Johns v. Bay
State Abrasive.Prod. Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
mGray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961) ; McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
'Schmidt v.: Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, Schmidt v.
Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 348 U.S. 819 (1954) ; Putnam v. Triangle Publica-
tions, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957) ; Insull.v. New York World Telegram
Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir, 1959).
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into Kentucky from its transmitter in West Virginia and relied upon ad-
vertisers in Kentucky for about three percent of its gross receipts was held
subject to Kentucky jurisdiction for a libel suit.' It is submitted that the
newspaper cases meet all of the elements of the minimum contacts test"
and are contrary to the most recent developments.'
Foreign Act with Local Consequence
The application of the purposeful act requirement to acts done outside
the state which have consequences within the state causes considerable
trouble. The requirement is satisfied if the defendant sends something into
the forum state with the expectation that a contract will be executed or
performed there and the cause of action arises out of that contract.' Much
more difficulty arises from the statutes in some states ' which permit juris-
diction over non-residents who commit a tort in whole or in part within the
jurisdiction. If the defendant commits an act outside the forum state
which results in an injury or other consequence within the state the forum
generally will be favored with trial convenience' and necessary govern-
mental interest.' Therefore, jurisdiction over these cases often depends
on the application of the third element, i.e., whether the defendant's activity
outside the state constituted an act whereby he purposefully availed him-
self of the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum.
If the act committed outside the state was committed with the inten-
mWSAZ, Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958) ; cf. Wanamaker v. Lewis, 153
F. Supp. 195 (D. Md. 1957).
'The newspaper companies have done, on their own initiative, an act whereby they
have obtained the benefit and protection of the laws of the forum state. Further,
trial convenience is generally greatest where the plaintiff has been injured; and
the forum state has an interest in protecting its citizens from defamation by non-
residents.
'EGray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961) ; McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. II. 1961).
It is interesting to note that the recently enacted New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules (Consol. Laws of N.Y. (C.P.L.R.) § 302 (a) (2) (1962)) explicitly ex-
cludes defamation from its otherwise broad authorization for service of process
over non-residents.
'"McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (sending a contract into
the state by mail) ; S. Howes Co. v. W.P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954)
(goods sold to an independent contractor outside the state were sent to the cus-
tomer within the state). A contrary result was reached, however, in Erlanger
Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1966), where the
contract was completed in New York and the goods were shipped f.o.b. the New
York plant. The court said that the fact that the defendant could reasonably ex-
pect the goods to reach the forum state (North Carolina) was not sufficient con-
tact to warrant jurisdiction in the forum for a breach of contract action. Ex-
tending jurisdiction this far, the court said, would constitute a threat to inter-
state commerce. Id. at 507. However, It is submitted that the defendant com-
mitted an act whereby it fully intended to make use of the forum state as a mar-
ket place for its goods. .Had the defendant's operation or its product been such
that distribution within the state was highly unlikely there may have been no
benefit or protection from the laws of North Carolina. But such facts do not ap-
pear In the case. The other two elements, especially trial convenience, may have
been an important factor in this case.15E.g., TEx. CIV. STAT., art. 2031b § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1960) ; MrNq. STAT. ANii.
§ 303.13(3) (1957) ; VT. STAT. ANN., 1959, tit. 12, § 855; Wis. STAT. § 262.05(4)(1959) ; REvism CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-2702-2 (Rule 4B (1) (b) (Herein-
after RavisD CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.).
' The court nearest to the scene of the injury is generally most convenient because
most of the witnesses and much of the evidence are found In that area.
I'mThe forum state has an interest in providing a local forum for redress of the wrong
inflicted upon Its residents and others within Its boundaries.
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tion of causing the consequences complained of, the act would certainly be
a purposeful act as described above. For example, if a man stands just out-
side the forum state and shoots a bullet into the forum state intending to
oause the resulting consequence he should be subject to the jurisdiction of
the state just as if he had been within the state when he fired the shot.'
Similarly, if a broadcasting company intentionally beamed its programs
into the forum state it should be subject to jurisdiction for defamation
arising out of such programs.'
If the defendant sends goods into the state which cause injury within
the state because of their defective manufacturing or packaging, he should
be subject to that state's jurisdiction, whether the injured party dealt with
the defendant directly' or whether he purchased the defendant's goods
through an independent contractor.' Further, it has been held that if
the defendant anticipated and expected his goods to be delivered into and
used within the forum state, that state has jurisdiction over him for causes
of action resulting from the negligent manufacture of those goods.' In
W. H. Elliott & Sons Co., Inc. v. Nuodex Products Co., Inc.' the plaintiff's
property in New Hampshire was damaged by paint originally manufactured
by a Massachusetts corporation using, as an ingredient, a chemical product
manufactured by the defendant in New Jersey. Although the defendant's
chemical ingredient was not sent into New Hampshire by the defendant,
the defendant fully anticipated and expected that it would get into the
state and be used there. In fact, the defendant had registered its product
under the New Hampshire economic poisons law and had conducted adver-
tising and sales campaigns within the state. Clearly, the defendant had
chosen New Hampshire as a substantial market place for its products and
benefited from the protection of the laws accordingly.
In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp." an Illinois
resident was injured by the explosion of a hot water heater manufactured
in Pennsylvania. A defective valve, made by the defendant in Ohio, had
been used in the construction of the heater. The court said the Ohio de-
fendant not only anticipated and expected that its valves would be used
'MSee Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial
Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REv. 249, 260 (1959).
'
mWanamaker v. Lewis, 153 F. Supp. 195 (D. Md. 1957); accord, WSAZ, Inc. v.
Lyons, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958).
'Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 271, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960) (truck
driver was injured while unloading defendant's acid product because of faulty
packaging in a foreign state) ; Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d
704 (1959) (defendant's hot water heater, shipped into the state, exploded and in-
jured the plaintiff).
"Cf., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); W.H. Elliott & Sons Co., Inc. v. Nuodex Prod. Co., Inc., 243
F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 1957). There are two cases holding that such a defendant is
not subject to the jurisdiction of the forum: Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prod.
Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950) ; Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416
(D. Minn. 1959). It is submitted that, under the rationale of the Gray case and
the Elliott case, supra, both of these cases are in error.
'Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961) ; McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1961) ;
W.H. Elliott & Sons Co., Inc. v. Nuodex Prod. Co., Inc., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir.
1957) ; Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1957)
(dictum) ; contra, Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co, 405 Pa. 123, 173 A.2d 123 (1961).
I243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 1957).
2i22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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in Illinois but its product enjoyed a "substantial use and consumption"
in the state. Again, it appears that the defendant relied on the Illinois
market as a substantial outlet for its products and enjoyed the benefits and
protection of the laws of Illinois accordingly.'
This anticipation and expectation rule clearly has its limitations. For
example, a tire dealer in California might sell a tire to a Pennsylvania
tourist while the latter is visiting in California. The dealer could not
reasonably be expected to defend an action in Pennsylvania for an injury
caused by that tire in Pennsylvania even though he clearly anticipated and
fully expected that the tire would be used in Pennsylvania.' It is submitted
that this situation can be distinguished from the situations in the Gray case
and the Nuodex case just discussed; here the tire dealer has not chosen
Pennsylvania as a market place for a substantial part of its products nor
does it rely on Pennsylvania as a substantial outlet for its products. There-
fore, the tire dealer would not have enjoyed the protection provided by
the laws of Pennsylvania to those who market their products in Pennsyl-
vania.
D. INTERRELATION OF THE THREE ELEMENTS
Jurisdiction cannot be maintained over a non-resident unless all three
elements are present. Fulfilling one of the elements alone would not be
sufficient.
To a limited extent the three elements may be dependent upon each
other. For example, doing a purposeful act may reduce the inconvenience
of requiring the defendent to defend in the forum and may add impetus
to the forum's governmental interest. Also, once trial convenience is found
to preonderate in favor of the forum state, it is much easier to find that
the state has a governmental interest in the litigation. Generally, however,
these three elements require quite different considerations.
It may be suggested that the strength of one element may permit a
lesser compliance with the other two. For example, if there is a strong or
high governmental interest in providing a forum within the state, the
requirement of trial convenience may be lessened; further, if there is a
weak governmental interest in the litigation, strong arguments must exist
in favor of trial convenience. This view is suggested by the American Law
Institute.' However it is submitted that if sufficient facts exist to satisfy
each of the elements, there is no need to measure or weigh the varying
degree of compliance with these elements.
E. OTHER TESTS
The American Law Institute, in the third tentative draft of the Re-
statement (Second), Conflict of Laws, states three "principal factors" to
be considered in determining the question of jurisdiction.' ° They are
'Id. at 766.
mErlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956)
(dictum).
'"REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, comment c at 91; comment d at
93 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956). As explained in the next section. the Restatement
divides the due process test into three principle factors which are quite analogous
to the three elements proposed herein.
'RESTATEMENT (SE)COND), CoNrucT OF LAWS § 84 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
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strikingly similar to the three elements proposed in this note. The first is
"the nature and quality of the act." Under this factor, the Restatement
cites such things as dangerous acts, acts subject to special regulation by the
forum state, and acts done for a pecuniary profit. Many of these same con-
siderations are necessary in meeting the requirement of governmental in-
terest. The second factor mentioned by the Restatement is "the extent of
defendant's contacts with the state." Although the term is obviously vague,
the contacts suggested seem to require some action under the defendant's
own initiative whereby he derives a benefit from the state, i.e., a purposeful
act. The third factor mentioned by the Restatement is inconvenience to the
defendant to stand trial in the forum state. Although trial convenience in-
cludes many considerations in addition to inconvenience to the defendant,
there is obviously much similarity between the Restatement's third factor
and the second element stated herein. It is submitted, however, that the Re-
statement test suffers from a lack of adequate clarification and definition
of the three principal factors.'
III. MONTANA'S NEW RULE 4B.
A court may not obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident not
found within the state unless a statute expressly authorizes such juris-
diction.' Further, such a statute must provide for a method of service of
process that is most likely to notify the defendant of the action.'
Since the International Shoe Co. v. Washington'" decision, a large
number of states have enacted legislation designed to expand their juris-
diction over non-residents.'" Montana's new Rule 4B, patterned after
the First Tentative Draft of the Uniform Extra-Territorial Process Act,
and the recent legislation in Illinois, Texas, and Wisconsin," definitely
takes a modern approach to the problem of personal jurisdiction over non-
residents.
A. PERSONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity
to be heard."" Inherent in this requisite is the right to have fair notice of
the pending litigation and reasonable opportunity to appear and defend.'
'A note in the Georgetown Law Journal has also suggested a three pronged test
for jurisdiction over non-residents. The three parts there suggested are as fol-
lows: (1) the defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction within
the state; (2) the cause of action must arise out of such activity; and (3) there
must be substantial minimum contact, i.e., convenience. However, it must be
noted that that note was concerned with situations in which only a single act had
been committe. Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations Based on a
Single Act: A New Sole for International Shoe, 47 GEo. L.J. 342 (1958).
1 Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Such juris-
diction was unknown at common law and, therefore, it requires express statutory
authorization. Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases
of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REV. 249, 265 (1959).
'Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) ; Wuchter v.
Plzzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
u'326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"E.g., SMITH-HURD ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1956) ; TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 2031b
(Vernon Supp. 1960) ; Wis. STAT. § 262.05 (1959) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13
(1957) ; VT. STAT. ANN. 1959, tit. 12 § 855; ANN. CODE OF MD. art. 23 § 92 (1957) ;
CONSOL LAWS OF N.Y. (C.P.L.R.) § 302 (1962) ; FLA. STAT. ch. 47.16 (1961) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 56-319 (1955) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.61-0 (1953).
"ISee Mason, The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 F.R.D. 23, 27.
"'Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).10Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ; Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
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Only then will the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
implicit in due process be satisfied.'0
It has long been established that personal jurisdiction over non-resi-
dents will not be consistent with due process unless the method used to
notify the defendant of the litigation is calculated to "make it reasonably
probable that he will receive actual notice."' Service of process upon the
Secretary of State, therefore, without any provision for an attempt to com-
municate with the defendant generally will not meet with the due process
test.' Similarly, service of process by publication, without further at-
tempt to locate the defendant will not meet the due process test.' Personal
service, however, is not indispensable.' If other methods actually convey
notice to the defendant,' or if there is no possible way to contact the de-
fendant except by publication or service on the Secretary of State," per-
sonal service is not required by the Constitution. In general, however, while
the requirement of contact with the forum state has been relaxed, the notice
requirement has become more stringent.
Although personal notice is not required to satisfy the due process
clause," the new Montana Rules make such notice a requisite for personal
jurisdiction." At this point the new Montana Rules impose a greater
'Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ; see McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957).
"OWuchter v. PizzuttiL 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928).
"aIbid.
'5Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 30W (1950). Here the ad-
dress of the defendant was known but no attempt was made to contact him by
mail or to make personal service.
'Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
' Ibid.
"5"This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a customary
substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or prac-
ticable to give more adequate warning. Thus it has been recognized that, in the
case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a prob-
ably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no
constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights." Id. at 317.1
'
6Even in Montana, the notice requirement was much less rigid under R.C.M. 1947,
§ 93-3013. This statute was superseded by the new rules.
'5Several states, including Wisconsin and Texas, provide for substituted service other
than personal service when the defendant cannot with reasonable diligence be
served personally. Wis. STAT. § 262.06 (1959) ; Trx. Civ. STAT. art. 2031b (Vernon
Supp. 1960).
It should be pointed out that service upon the defendant while he is outside
the state is substituted service even though he may have been served personally.
See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917). A summons orders the defendant
to appear; if the defendant is outside the boundaries of the state the summons can
have no compulsory effect but will be effective only as notice. If the service Is
binding, the distinction is technical and most courts make no mention of such a
distinction. See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Ehrenzweig suggests the term
"personal service" should apply to a hand to hand delivery within the state, the
term "substituted service" should apply to all other forms of service within the
state, and the term "constructive service" to all forms of service outside the state.
EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws 89 (1959).
"5R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2702-2D(3) (Rule 41)(3)). "Where service upon any person
cannot, with due diligence, be made personally within this state, service of sum-
mons and complaint may be made by service outside this state in the manner pro-
vided for service within this state, with the same force and'effect as though service
had been made within this state .... Ibid. Service by publication is still per-
mitted but it is limited to actions involving property located within the state.
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2702-2D(5) (Rule 41)(5)).
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diligence than due process requires and, consequently, are more limited
than the constitutional requirements.
B. AREAS NOT COVERED
The new Montana Rules do not extend the jurisdiction of the Montana
courts to the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution of the United
States in other respects. In fact two of the major areas previously discussed
in Part I herein have not been included.
First, domiciliation is not included as a basis for obtaining jurisdiction;
therefore, a domiciliary of Montana who cannot be found within the state
is not expressly subject to the jurisdiction of the Montana courts unless
he has committed one of the acts listed in Rule 4B (1).' " It may be argued
that jurisdiction over absent domiciliaries was possible at common law
and that an expess statutory authorization is unnecessary. Just such an
argument has been made under the old statute; this statute also did not
expressly subject absent domiciliaries to the jurisdiction of Montana
courts.1' However, Rule 4B cannot be said to be declaratory of the com-
mon law ;' thus, it would be difficult to ignore the applicable rule of statu-
tory construction, i.e., when the legislature changes one aspect of the com-
mon law, it is deemed to have rejected the application of the common law
in that particular field."
Also, it could be argued that jurisdiction over an absent domiciliary
could be obtained on the authority of subsection 4B (2). Entitled "Acquisi-
tion of Jurisdiction" it states: "Jurisdiction may be acquired by our courts
over any person through service of process as herein provided; . . ." There
is no language in subsection 4D (3), "Personal Service Outside the State,"
which would prevent effective service on a domiciliary outside the state.
Thus, personal service outside the state on a domiciliary seems to be auth-
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2702-2B(1). The only authorization under the new Rules for
jurisdiction over anyone is contained in the following language of Rule 4B(1) ;
"All persons found within the state of Montana are subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state. In addition, any person is subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing personally,
through an employee, or through an agent, of any of the following acts:
(a) the transaction of any business within this state;
(b) the commission of any act which results in accrual within this state of a
tort action ;
(c) the ownership, use, or possession of any property, or of any interest there-
in, situated within this state:
(d) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting;
(e) entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for materials to be
furnished in this state by such person; or
(f) acting as director, manager, trustee, or other officer of any corporation
organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within, this
state, or as executor or administrator of any estate within this state.
"'Note, Procedure: Sub8tituted Service on Domiciliary by Notice Outside the State,
1941 MONT. L. REv. 112. The proposition that jurisdiction over domicillaries was
permitted at common law is substantiated by RESTATEMENT, CoiNTucr OF LAWS
§§ 77 and 79 (1934). Evidently the question was never presented to the Montana
Supreme Court under the old statute, so there is no way of knowing what the re-
sult would have been.
"Supra, note 142.
O"In this state there is no common law in any case where the law is declared by
the code or the statute .... " R.C.M. 1947, § 12-104. See Simonson v. McDonald,
131 Mont. 494, 311 P.2d 982 (1957).
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orized and such authorization seems to grant jurisdiction to the courts.
This argument would raise the question of whether the grounds for juris-
diction as set forth in Rule 4B (1) state the exclusive bases for personal
jurisdiction. That subsection simply states that certain persons are subject
to the jurisdiction of the Montana courts; it does not say that these are
the only persons subject to the courts' jurisdiction. However, if jurisdiction
were not limited to the situations specified in 4B (1) the Montana statute
would authorize an extention of personal jurisdiction to the limits of per-
missibility under the Constitution, whenever the defendant could be served
personally. This would deprive 4B (1) of all its significance and it can-
not be presumed that the legislature intended to enact legislation without
meaning.' Therefore, it is likely that 4B (1) will be interpreted as stating
the exclusive bases of personal jurisdiction except as otherwise provided.
The second major area not expressly included in the scope of the new
Rules is jurisdiction over non-residents for actions unrelated to their con-
tact with the state. Rule 4B (1) limits jurisdiction over persons not found
in Montana to causes of action arising out of the specified "acts" only.'
Inasmuch as jurisdiction by substituted service over non-residents for ac-
tions unrelated to their contact with the state was unknown at common
law"' such jurisdiction would not be authorized in Montana. A different
result would be reached, however, if the Montana Supreme Court does not
interpret 4B (1) as exclusive.
C. STATUTES NOT REPEALED
It is particularly significant that serveral existing Montana statutes
involving service of process on non-residents were not repealed when the
new Rules were enacted. The statute providing for service of process upon
foreign corporations which have qualified to do business within the state
was not repealed." The non-resident motorist statute was not re-
pealed." The statutes providing for service upon the insurance commissioner
as the process agent for an authorized or unauthorized insurer were not
repealed.' Finally, the statutes providing for service upon the investment
commissioner as process agent for foreign investment companies"' and for
broker-dealers, investment advisees, and salesmen of securities" were not
repealed. These statutes provide for service of process on a state official
who is authorized by appointment or by law to receive such service. To
the extent the above statutes are inconsistent with the new Rules, the
former will probably prevail; although the new rules are later in time
the above statutes are more specific and, according to the accepted rule
'"Montana Life Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 106 Mont. 500, 78 P.2d 946 (1938) ; Corwin v.
Bieswanger, 126 Mont. 337, 251 P.2d 232 (1952).
'Siupra, note 159.
"'Supra, note 142.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3008. This statute provides for substituted service upon the
Secretary of State under certain specified conditions.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 53-202. This statute also provides for service on the Secretary of
State.
20R.C.M. 1947, § 40-2818; R.C.M. 1947, § 40-3404.
'eR.C.M. 1947, § 66-2010.
2"R.C.M. 1947, § 15-2015.
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of statutory construction, a general statute must yield to a more specific
statute which is inconsistent therewith."'
D. TIIE TRANSACTION OF ANY BUSINESS
One area of the new Rules which is certain to cause a great deal of
litigation is subsection 4B (1) (a). 2 That subsection includes as one of the
acts which will subject a person to jurisdiction "the transaction of any
business within this state." It is identical with a subsection of both the
Illinois Civil Practice Act,"' and the First Tentative Draft of the Uniform
Extra-Territorial Process Act.
The term "transaction of any business" would appear to be very
similar in meaning to the term "doing business." The later is a term
found in several of the Montana statutes and it may have different mean-
ings for different purposes. In Montana "doing business" appears in the
statutes pertaining to the qualification of foreign corporations,"' and in
the corporation license tax law," and a modified form of the term is found
in the new Rule 4B (1) (a).
The new Texas law pertaining to jurisdiction over non-residents uses
the term "doing business." In fact, the term is defined in the statute it-
self. It reads as follows :17
For the purpose of this Act, and -without including other acts
that may constitute doing business, any foreign corporation, joint
stock company, association, partnership, or non-resident natural
person shall be deemed doing business in this State by entering
into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be
performed in whole or in part by either party in this State, or
the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this State.
It is apparent that such a definition would extend the concept of doing
business nearly to the limits of permissible personal jurisdiction under the
constitution."' It should be noted that the commission of a tort, even when
not wholly committed within the state, is declared to be "doing business."
California apparently construes the term "doing business" as synonymous
r'State ex rel. Charette v. District Court, 107 Mont. 489, 86 P.2d 750 (1939) ; State
ex rel. State Aeronautics Comm'n v. Board of Examiners, 121 Mont. 402, 194 P.2d
633 (1948). The insurance statutes, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 40-2818 and 40-3404, are in-
cluded in Table A which lists special statutory proceedings which are expressly
excepted from the rules insofar as they are inconsistent with or in conflict with
the procedure provided in the new rules. Rule 81 (R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2711-1). Clear-
ly where the procedural details required to perfect service on a specified state of-
ficial are different from the details required under the new rules it is best to
follow the former. See Mason, The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 MONT.
L. REv. 3, 14 (1961).
"'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2702-2B (1) (a).
'
3 SMITH-HURD IL . AN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (a) (1956).
"'RC.M. 1947, § 15-1701.
-"
5R.C.M. 1947, § 84-1501.0 EEx. Cirv. STAT. art. 2031b, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1960).
'See the three elements of the due process test suggested in Part II of this article.
The only possible area under the due process clause that may not be covered by
this statute is a situation resulting from a contractual relationship with a non-
resident outside the state, where the non-resident fully intends to ship goods into
the state for sale. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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with those business activities required by the due process clause as a basis
for jurisdiction."
The Montana Supreme Court, however, has not given such a broad
definition to the term. It has interpreted "doing business" as found in
the service of process statute in exactly the same way it interpreted "doing
business" as found in the corporate qualification statutes.' According to
the Montana court, doing business requires more than a single sale, more
than mere solicitation, and more or less a continuing course of business
within the state even though a resident business agent within the state is
not required.'
Perhaps this same definition will be applied to the words of the new
Rule, "transaction of any business." It is unlikely that a definition as
broad as the one adopted in California will be applied because such a
definition would deprive the remaining subsections of 4B (1) of any
meaning or effect; if "transaction of any business" includes everything
that the constitution permits, the listing of other items permitted by the
statute is meaningless. It should not be presumed that the legislature in-
tended the remaining subsections to be without meaning or effect.'
Because Illinois has the same subsection stated in exactly the same
words' it may be helpful to see how they have defined "transaction of
any business." The Illinois courts have looked to "some" business within
the state but have not insisted on continuous and systematic business.'
"The words of subsection (a) of Section 17 cannot be given a restrictive
"9Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture Lab., Inc., 118 Cal. App. 2d 211, 257 P.2d 727 (1953) ;
Florence Nightingale School of Nursing, Inc. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 2d
74, 335 P.2d 240 (1959).
"In fact, it seems to us that the meaning of that phrase [doing business], as used
in the various sections referred to above, must necessarily be the same in each
Instance." State ex rel. American Laundry Mach. Co. v. District Court, 98 Mont.
278, 285, 41 P.2d 26, 29 (1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 744 (1935). This case has
been followed quite recently by Graham and Ross Mercantile Co. v. Sprout, Wal-
dron & Co., 174 F. Supp. 551 (D. Mont. 1959) and Minnehoma Financial Co. v.
C.J. Van Oosten, 198 F. Supp. 200 (D. Mont. 1961).
1
rState ex rel. Taylor Laundry Co. v. District Court, 102 Mont. 274, 279, 57 P.2d 772,
775 (1936). "In a general way it may be said that the business must be such in
character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has sub-
jected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which it is served, and
in which it is bound to appear when a proper agent has been served with process.
Isolated transactions do not constitute a doing of business within the meaning of
the statute; it contemplates a more or less continuing course of business."
'raIt is interesting to note that the UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE
ACT, adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1962 (this act supplanted the proposed Uniform Extra-Territorial Process Act,
the Extra-Territorial Process Act being incorporated into the Interstate and In-
ternational Procedure Act as Article I) section 1.03 [Personal Jurisdiction Based
upon Conduct] provides in part as follows: "(a) A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of
action] [claim for relief] arising from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(b) When jurisdiction over. a person is based solely upon this section, only a
[cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this section
may be asserted against him." The Act has thus made it clear that the bounds
of "transacting any business" are to be limited, and that the following enumerated
acts are to be given full force and effect.
'ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 110; § 17(1) (a) (1957).1
"Berlemann v. Superior Distrib. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 522, 151 N.E.2d 116 (4th Dis.
1958),
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interpretation based upon the old Illinois 'doing business' cases."i' Courts
have often said that this subsection of the Illinois Act extends statutory
authorization as far as due process permits.' However, where the case
clearly involves a tort, statutory authority is said to exist under subsection
17 (1) (b) which is similar to subsection 4B (1) (b) of the Montana
Rules.'
The Illinois statute differs from the Montana statute in one significant
respect. It does not contain subsections (e) and (f) or anything similar
thereto. Subsection 4B (1) (e) states: "entering into a contract for services
to be rendered or for materials to be furnished in this state by such per-
sons." These words would appear to include any and all isolated business
transactions. If Montana were to give a definition to "transaction of any
business" similar to the definition Illinois has given those words, subsec-
tion (e) would have no meaning unless it were interpreted to include extra-
territorial executory contracts where no single act has been consummated
in Montana.' Therefore, the previous Montana definition of 'doing busi-
ness," i.e., more or less a continuing course of business within the state,
may well be applied to the term "transaction of any business."
E. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE WORD "ACT"
Rule 4B (1) reads in part as follows: ". . . any person is subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising
from the doing personally, through an employee, or through and agent,
'"Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
'Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas Co., 249 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Kaye-Martin v. Brooks,
267 F.2d 394, 397 (7th Cir. 1959).
'See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
'"There is some authority for the contention that subsection 4B (1) (e) was intended
to cover the situation in which a wholly executory extraterritorial contract is in-
volved. See Wis. STAT. § 262.05, which provides in part as follows:
262.05 PERSONAL JURISDICTION, GROUNDS FOR GENERALLY
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction
over a person served in an action pursuant to s. 262.06 under any of the follow-
ing circumstances:
(5) LOCAL SERVICES, GOODS OR CONTRACTS. In any action which:
(a) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some
third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services
within this state or to pay for services to be performed in this state by the
plaintiff; or
See alos the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, § 1.03
(a) (1) and (2). These subsections provide:
SECTION 1.03. [Personal Jurisdiction Based upon Conduct.]
(a) A coprt may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising
from the person's:
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
The Comment regarding section 1.03(a) (1) notes that it "... is derived
from the Illinois Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 110, § 17(1) (a). This provision should
be gived the same expansive interpretation that was intended by the draftsmen
of the Illinois Act and has been given by the courts of that state. See, e.g.,
Berlemann v. Superior Distributing Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 522, 151 N.E.2d 116
(1958).... .." The Comment regarding section 1.03(a) (2) refers to Wis. Stat.
§ 262.05.
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of any of the following acts: . . ." (Emphasis supplied). Apparently,
jurisdiction over a non-resident could not be obtained unless some "act"
were committed. However, included in the "acts" listed by the statute is the
"ownership" and "possession" of property. In order to include the owner-
ship or possession of property within the definition of the word "act" it
must be presumed a very broad definition of that word was intended. '
Also, subsection 4B (1) (b) lists the "commission of any act" which
results in accural of a tort action as a basis for personal jurisdiction. It is
submitted that the term "commission of any act" should be interpreted
to include the "omission fo any act" as well.'" If this interpretation were
not adopted an important part of the torts field would be omitted from
the scope of the statute.
F. ACCRUAL WITHIN THis STATE OF A TORT ACTION
The act listed by subsection 4B (1) (b) is stated as follows: "the
commission of any act which results in accrual within this state of a tort
action." It is submitted that under the test set forth in Part II of this
Article,'" not all acts which result in the accrual within this state of a
tort action would meet the due process test for conferring jurisdiction on
non-residents. For example, suppose a California tire retailer sells a tire
to a Montana resident while the latter is vacationing in California. If the
tire later causes an accident in Montana the California dealer would have
committed an act which resulted in the "accrual within this state of a tort
action." However, as previously stated, the mere selling of a defective tire
to a resident in a distant state would not meet the contacts test set forth
above.t
A statute will always be interpreted to preserve its constitutionality.1"
The phrase "accrual within this state of a tort action" must therefore be
construed to extend jurisdiction to the extent permissible under the due
process clause of the Constitution and no further. It must meet the three-
pronged test set forth above.
No provision is made for obtaining jurisdiction over an act committed
or omitted in Montana which results in the accrual of a tort action outside
the state. The Wisconsin statute provides expressly for jurisdiction over
'The UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PiRocEuRE ACT eliminates the word
"act" by stating "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from
the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
Wisconsin uses the word "circumstances" instead of the word "acts". Wis. STAT.
§ 262.05 (1959).
'The UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCED-URE Acvr, § 1.03(a) (4) Pro-
vides as follows: "causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission out-
side this state .. " (Emphasis added).
'"The test, to repeat, has three parts: (1) Is there a governmental interest In pro-
viding a forum for the litigation; (2) Does the forum figure favorably in regard
to trial convenience; (3) Has the defendant done some purposeful act by which
he has obtained the benefit and protection of the forum's laws.
"9'See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
'OState ex rel. James v. Aronson, 132 Mont. 120, 314 P.2d 849 (1957) ; State ex rel.
Great No, Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 121 Mont. 583, 194 P.2d 627 (1948).
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such acts." However, if neither party is a resident of Wisconsin, trial con-
venience will probably weigh heavily against the courts of the forum and
these acts may not meet the test for due process.
CONCLUSION
Since Pevnnoer v. Neff established the concept of personal jurisdiction
based on physical presence, the scope of personal jurisdiction over non-
residents has expanded considerably. Development has taken place in
several well defined areas, i.e., jurisdiction over domiciliaries, non-resi-
dent mortists, foreign corporations, non-resident individuals, and non-
resident individuals or corporations for actions unrelated to their contacts
with the state. All of these areas were effected by International Shoe Co. v.
Washington which defined the due process requirement in terms of a
relationship between the defendant and the forum state. Finally in Han-
son v. Denckla this concept of personal jurisdiction was limited and
further refined.
From this background of judicial opinion, we have proposed a three-
pronged test to determine whether the facts of a particular case meet the
"minimum contacts" requirement for due process of law under the Con-
stitution. First, there must be a governmental interest in providing a
forum for the litigation. Second, the forum must figure favorably in re-
gard to trial convenience. And third, the defendant must have done some
purposeful act by which he has obtained the benefits and protection of the
laws of the forum. All three of these elements must be presented in each
case to meet the "minimum contacts" test.
Montana's new Rule 4B takes a modern approach to the general
question of personal jurisdiction over non-residents. It provides a safe
method for insuring the necessary notice requirement by permitting per-
sonal service of process outside the state. It gives statutory authorization
for all of the general fields in which there has been a general develop-
ment of expanded jurisdiction except in the area of jurisdiction over
domiciliaries and the area of jurisdiction over non-residents for actions
unrelated to their contact with the state. It leaves in effect several special
statutes which provide for methods of bringing non-residents within the
jurisdiction of the court, principally the non-resident motorist statute and
the service of process statute pertaining to foreign corporations which
have qualified to do business within the state. However, it leaves open a
difficult question of interpreting the scope and meaning of the words
"transaction of any business within the state" and "accrual of a tort
action within the state." Also, there are a few minor problems resulting
from the difficulty in characterizing the word "act."
In this rapidly changing field, certainty is nearly impossible. How-
ever, within the general outline of Rule 4B the Montana Supreme Court
can develop a firm concept of the scope of personal jurisdiction over non-
residents in Montana.
"'WIs. STAT. § 22.05(3) (1959). "[Courts will have jurisdiction over the follow-
ing circumstances:] In any action claiming injury to person or property within or
without this state arising out of an act or omission within this state by the defend-
ant."
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